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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, CORPORATE LAW, AND
THE ALI CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
PROJECT*
Elliottj. Weisi4
INTRODUCTION
Debate about the corporate governance system now is focused on
the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Projept.1 The
scholarly articles and professional discussions that presaged the Project
showed clearly that the rules governing the rights and obligations of the
principal participants in publicly held corporations reflect the somewhat
serendipitous influence of a variety of historical, political, economic, and
social forces, rather than a coherent theory of shareholder/manager re-
lationships.2 The Project's stated goal-to create a "new art form," a set
Copyright @ 1984, Elliott J. Weiss.
f Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; Visiting
Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, 1983-84. A.B. 1961, Dartmouth; LL.B. 1964, Yale. I
wish to thank William W. Bratton, Jr., Stephen Diamond, Donald E. Schwartz, and partici-
pants in the Cornell Law School faculty seminar for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this
Article.
I This Article refers to the three drafts of the American Law Institute Corporate Gov-
ernance Project, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE: RESTATE-
MENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as ALI Draft No.
1] and PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(Tent. Drafts No. 2 & No. 3, 1984) [hereinafter cited ALI Draft No. 2 and ALI Draft No. 3] as
the "ALI Project," the "ALI," or the "Project."
2 See COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUqTURE AND GOVERNANCE (D. Schwartz
ed. 1979) (report on series of meetings sponsored by the ALI and the American Bar Associa-
tion) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES]; Kaplan, F'duciag Responsibility in the Management of
the Corporation, 31 Bus. Law. 883 (1976) (report on conference sponsored by the ABA Section
on Banking, Business and Corporation Law); Corporate Governance in America, 54 THE AMERI-
CAN ASSEMBLY 1 (1978).
In the early part of the 20th century, corporate law consisted largely of economic restric-
tions on corporate activities and the structure of shareholder/manager relationships. These
restrictions reflected long-standing legislative suspicions about the potential power of corpora-
tions, a judicial tradition of viewing corporate charters as contracts among shareholders and
between corporations and the state, and notions of fiduciary obligation and organizational
structure more appropriate to trusts or to small, closely held corporations than to large, pub-
licly held, business organizations. A corporation's internal affairs are governed by the laws of
its state of incorporation, but the corporation otherwise is free to engage in a variety of busi-
nesses in other states. This freedom has caused many managers to incorporate in states whose
laws imposed the fewest restrictions on their operations. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517,
548 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (outlining historical restrictions embodied in corporate
law).
One major theme in the literature is that state corporate law largely reflects efforts by
state legislatures and courts to pander to the self-aggrandizing inclinations of corporate fidu-
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of proposals that would transcend mere restatement of existing doc-
trines3-recognized implicitly the less than satisfactory condition of the
field of corporate law.
To date, the ALI Project has addressed all important areas of cor-
porate law except transactions involving control. The Project's propos-
als cover corporate purpose and structure, directors' duties of due care
and loyalty, and remedies.4 In general, the Project has recommended
relatively modest, incremental changes in current doctrine, most of
which would limit managers' autonomy or increase their vulnerability
to shareholder derivative suits. These recommendations have met with
predictable opposition from the corporate community, led by The Busi-
ness Roundtable.5 But they also have evoked largely critical responses
from academic commentators, who have pointed out that the ALI pro-
posals suffer from an absence of coherence similar to that which plagues
the existing corporate governance system.6
These early reactions highlight the need for the ALI Project to
ciaries. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974) (criticizing Delaware's corporate jurisprudence as too permissive). Some commenta-
tors claim this criticism is unbalanced, in that it does not credit cases in which state courts
have imposed liability on corporate fiduciaries or disallowed conduct that they viewed as
exploitative. See, e.g., Arsht, Reply to Professor Caq, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113, 1114-16 (1976). Others
dispute this criticism on economic grounds. See, e.g., Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theogy of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUDIES 251, 256-57 (1977). Professor Winter
argues that investors are sensitive to risks of managerial exploitation and, therefore, will pay
less for shares of a corporation domiciled in a jurisdiction that permits such exploitation. He
concludes that such corporations will pay more for capital, ultimately impairing their ability
to compete or forcing them to relocate in jurisdictions where they can raise capital on the
same terms as their competitors. All these comments have some merit, but none is wholly
persuasive.
3 See COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 554 (remarks of Louis Loss).
4 In May 1982, the American Law Institute discussed its ALI Draft No. 1, which dealt
with corporate objectives, corporate structure, the duty of care, and remedies. The ALI sub-
sequently retitled the project and issued two additional drafts. ALI Draft No. 2, supra note I
(modifying recommendations made in first draft concerning corporate objectives and corpo-
rate structure); ALI Draft No. 3, surpa note 1 (modifying recommendations on duty of care
and adding new proposals concerning duty of loyalty). At its 1984 meeting, the Institute
tentatively approved §§ 2.01 (The Objective and Conduct of the Business Corporation), 3.01
(Management of the Corporation's Business: Power and Functions of Senior Executives), and
3.02 (Powers and Functions of the Board of Directors). See Membership Reviews Latest Drafts at
1984 Annual Meeting, 6 ALI REPORTER 1, 7 (july 1984). The Institute was not asked to vote
on ALI Draft No. 3 because the ALI Council had not completed consideration of that draft.
Although ALI Draft No. I discussed remedies, neither the second nor the third drafts deal
with that subject.
5 See STATEMENT OF THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE'S PROPOSED "PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNMENT AND STRUCTURE: RESTATE-
MENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS" (1983) [hereinafter cited as ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT].
6 See Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35
Stan. L. Rev. 927 (1983); Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1259
(1982); Branson, Countertrends in Corporation Law: Model Business Corporation Act Revision, British
Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REv. 53
(1983).
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more thoroughly examine existing corporate law doctrines and to rec-
ommend more radical, nonincremental changes to the present system.7
If the Project's recommendations are to command the respect, if not the
support, of the bench, the bar, the academy, and the corporate commu-
nity, they must constitute a comprehensive and internally consistent set
of rules for corporate governance. Analysis of the recent literature of
corporate governance suggests developing such rules is feasible. A wide-
spread consensus has developed about most important aspects of corpo-
rate structure and shareholder/manager relationships. Consequently,
the ALI Project needs to resolve only a few basic issues.
Professor Kenneth Scott's thoughtful critique of the ALI Project's
first round of proposals is suggestive of the approach the Project should
employ.8 He recommends that the ALI consider explicitly the growing
body of economic literature dealing with corporate governance issues, as
well as recent judicial trends. The economic literature, Professor Scott
argues, supports a number of dramatic changes in corporate law, includ-
ing abolishing liability for breaches of the duty of due care and restruc-
turing the derivative suit to deter more effectively breaches of the duty
of loyalty. Judicial attitudes, he suggests, are not likely to change, and
must be appreciated by any who propose to revise corporate law
doctrines.
This Article adopts a systematic approach, similar to that suggested
by Professor Scott, to develop a more comprehensive outline of the key
elements of the corporate governance system. The Article endorses Pro-
fessor Scott's specific proposals concerning duty of care liability and
shareholder derivative suits; it makes additional proposals concerning
outside directors, the duty of loyalty, and the regulation of transactions
involving potential changes in corporate control; and, finally, it com-
ments briefly on the need for corporate law rules regulating disclosure of
corporate information and on the ALI Project's approach to corporate
social accountability. First, however, the Article describes briefly the
consensus view of the major elements in the corporate governance sys-
tem and summarizes the ALI Project's approach to critical corporate
governance issues.
A. The Structure of the System
The following propositions are widely accepted and serve as prem-
ises on which a system of rules for the governance of publicly held corpo-
7 The threat of controversy should not lead the ALI to abandon efforts to rethink basic
issues of corporate law. In addition to Professor Scott, see Scott, supra note 6, Bayless Man-
ning has called on the ALI Project to propose nonincremental changes, especially with regard
to the duty of care. Manning, The Business judgmenl Rule and the Director's Duty of Altention:
Tme For Realily, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1478-80 (1983).
8 Scott, supra note 6.
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rations should be based:9
- The corporate form of organization provides suppliers of capital
("shareholders") and suppliers of entrepreneurial skills ("managers")
with a potentially efficient vehicle for pursuing economic gain.
- Shareholders and managers have a joint interest in enhancing
corporate profits. Shareholders benefit from increases in their corpo-
ration's assets due to profitable operations. Managers will be more
secure in their jobs and are likely to receive greater compensation if
their firms operate profitably; in addition, their value as managers
will increase. Finally, if a firm's profits increase, the firm will be able
to raise capital on more favorable terms, lowering its production costs
and thus enhancing its ability to compete successfully.
- Despite shareholders' and managers' shared interest in enhancing
corporate profits, managers inevitably will make some decisions that
result in losses. Some losses will be due to managers' bad judgments,
others to bad luck.
- Apart from the impact of managers' bad judgments, shareholders
will realize less than their full share of a corporation's potential in-
come because sometimes managers' interests will conflict with those of
shareholders and some managers will choose to impose "agency costs"
on their corporations. For example, inept managers may use corpo-
rate resources to resist efforts to oust them from their positions, and
self-aggrandizing managers will enrich themselves at the expense of
their corporations. Moreover, managers whose conduct is likely to be
deemed unsatisfactory or improper often will cover up or misrepresent
what they have done.
- Shareholders can take a number of actions to protect themselves
against the impact of agency costs. 10 They can diversify their invest-
ments among a number of corporations (which also provides protec-
tion against bad luck), and they can discount the price they are
prepared to pay for any given corporation's stock. If they already
own stock and become dissatisfied with managers' performance, they
can exit, or sell their stock, or they can voice their dissatisfaction by
voting to elect new managers or by suing to remedy breaches of fidu-
ciary duty." Because exit is cheap and "voice" often is expensive,
9 These propositions are consistent with works of legal scholarship reflecting such
widely divergent points of view as Scott, id.; Fischel, supra note 6; Winter, supra note 2; Weiss,
Social Regulation of Business Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institu-
tional Impasse, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343 (1981); and M. EiSENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION (1976). They also draw heavily on relevant economic and management litera-
ture, which is well summarized in Williamson, The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attrib-
utes, 19 J. ECON. LIT. 1537 (1981) (stressing need for analysis that takes account not only of
market forces and economic theory, but of "bounded rationality"--humans' limited ability to
analyze and solve complex problems-and "opportunism"--self-aggrandizing behavior com-
bined with guile). The ALI Project acknowledges the relevance of this literature. See ALI
Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.02 reporter's note 2.
10 As used here, "agency costs" include both the costs of managers' bad judgments and
the costs of their self-serving use of corporate resources.
1i For a seminal work on the need to analyze institutional arrangements in terms of the
[Vol. 70:1
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ineffective, or both, most shareholders will favor exit.
- The "'voice" mechanisms remain significant in two contexts.
First, new shareholders prepared to buy a substantial portion of a cor-
poration's stock or existing shareholders prepared to finance a proxy
contest can use shareholder voting rights to replace inept or self-ag-
grandizing managers. Second, attorneys prepared to represent share-
holders on a contingency fee basis can use derivative suits to police
managers' breaches of their fiduciary duties. In both contexts, the
mechanisms' effectiveness depends significantly on the availability of
information about managers' performance and self-dealing.
- Outside, or nonmanagement, directors have the potential to
monitor managers' performance more efficiently than shareholders,
potential shareholders, or plaintiffs' attorneys. Outside directors are
not always effective monitors, though, and there is little evidence that
corporations with boards consisting primarily of outside directors are
more profitable or more highly valued by investors than other
corporations.
B. Recommendations of the ALI Project
The most central of the ALI Corporate Governance Project's rec-
ommendations are those concerning corporate structure. 12 The Project
distinguishes between senior executives, who actually manage a corpora-
tion's business, and boards of directors, which oversee, or monitor, man-
agement's performance. The Project endorses the view that outside
directors potentially are the most efficient monitors of management per-
formance and encourages publicly held corporations to have outside di-
rectors play an enhanced role in selecting executives, reviewing major
corporate decisions, passing on the propriety of conflict-of-interest trans-
actions, and ensuring the integrity of their corporations' financial re-
ports. -However, the Project does not address explicitly critical issues
concerning the extent to which corporate law can or should be the vehi-
cle for ensuring that outside directors perform these duties effectively.
The Project does approach this issue indirectly, through its discus-
sion of the duty of care.' 3 It recommends increasing the threat of liabil-
ity for breach of the duty to stimulate directors to perform diligently.
However, the Project recognizes that fear of personal liability may lead
directors to avoid reasonable business risks or may discourage qualified
people from serving as directors.' 4 Therefore, the Project recommends
that the increased threat of liability be limited largely to losses due to
comparative influence of market forces (or "exit") and members' participation (or "voice"),
see A. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE AND LOYALTY (1970).
12 See ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, Part III (Structure of the Corporation).
13 See ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, Part IV (Duty of Care and the Business Judgment
Rule).
14 See ALI Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 7.06 (Damages Resulting From a Breach of Duty:
Minimum and Maximum Limits).
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errors of omission, and that a dollar limit be placed on directors' poten-
tial liability for merely negligent omissions. It is noteworthy that the
Project does not discuss whether the costs of enforcing the duty of care
through threats of liability outweigh the benefits generated by such
threats.
The ALI Project appears to accept the view that the purpose of the
duty of loyalty is to ensure that the terms of covered transactions-those
in which the interests of directors, managers, or controlling shareholders
conflict directly or indirectly with those of the corporation-are at least
as favorable to the corporation as would be the terms of an arm's length
transaction negotiated with an unrelated party.' 5 As concerns the criti-
cal issue of how the duty of loyalty best can be enforced, the ALI Project
emphasizes the benefits of having independent decisionmakers, who
may be directors or shareholders, approve duty of loyalty transactions.
If an independent decisionmaker approves a transaction, the Project
would limit a shareholder challenging that transaction largely to ques-
tioning whether the decisionmaker was provided with all material infor-
mation about the transaction. Absent approval by an independent
decisionmaker, the Project would place on the party defending the
transaction the burden of proving the transaction was fair. The ALI
also proposes to encourage derivative suits alleging breaches of the duty
of loyalty, but it would retain some special procedural requirements to
guard against potentially exploitative derivative suits. 16
The ALI Project plans to treat transactions involving managers' use
of corporate resources to fend off threats to their control separately from
those covered by the duty of care, even though they often involve unre-
lated parties, and separately from those covered by the duty of loyalty,
even though they often advance managers' personal interests at the ex-
pense of a corporation and its shareholders. The Project has not other-
wise discussed these transactions. 17 If the Project's approach in other
areas is indicative of the approach it will take here, it is reasonable to
expect the Project to recommend that use of corporate resources to pro-
tect control be allowed only where independent directors approve a de-
fensive action and can prove that their decision was reasonable, or fair.
A subsidiary issue relating both to duty of loyalty transactions and
to the market for corporate control concerns the extent to which corpo-
rate law should require corporations to disclose to shareholders informa-
tion about corporate financial performance. The ALI Project only deals
with disclosure questions indirectly, in its discussion of the responsibili-
15 See ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, Part V (Duty of Loyalty).
16 See ALI Draft No. 1, supra note 1, Part VII (Remedies).
17 The ALI Project designated Part VI "Transactions in Control." ALI Draft Nos. 1-3
have not addressed this part. See id at xv.
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ties of audit committees. 18 Thus, it adopts implicitly the traditional
view that these questions are to be dealt with primarily by the federal
securities laws.
Finally, there is the question of the extent to which corporate law
should require or allow corporations to use their resources to advance
the interests of nonshareholders. The issues here, though more political
than technical, were prominent in the discussions that preceded the ALI
Project' 9 and have been addressed briefly by the Project. It specifies
that managers must remain within the law while engaged in the pursuit
of corporate profits. The ALI also recommends that managers be al-
lowed to expend corporate resources to advance social or ethical objec-
tives relevant to their corporations' businesses, in addition to using
reasonable amounts of corporate resources to support charitable
activities. 20
I
INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The ALI Project assigns a central role in the corporate governance
process to boards of directors composed primarily of nonmanagement
directors who have no other significant relationships with their corpora-
tion or its senior executives. 2 ' These boards would devote their energies
largely to monitoring management's performance. 22 To this end, the
Project would require large, publicly held corporations23 to have audit
committees composed entirely of nonemployee directors,24 at least a ma-
jority of whom would be unaffiliated.25 The Project also recommends,
"as a matter of corporate practice," 26 that every publicly held corpora-
tion have at least three unaffiliated directors, and that large, publicly
held corporations have a majority of unaffiliated directors. 27 It further
18 See ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, §§ 3.03 (Audit Committee in First Tier Corpora-
tions), 3.05 (Audit Committee in Second-Tier Corporations; Powers and Functions of the
Audit Committee).
19 See COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 245-83.
20 See ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01 (The Objective and Conduct of the Business
Corporation).
21 For the purposes of this Article, directors lacking significant relationships to a corpo-
ration or its senior management personnel shall be referred to as "unaffiliated directors."
22 See ALI Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 3.02.
23 A large, publicly held corporation is defined as a corporation having 2,000 or more
record holders of its equity securities and $100 million of total assets. ALI Draft No. 1, supra
note 1, § 1.15.
24 An outside, or nonemployee director, as distinguished from an unaffiliated director, is
not an employee of the corporation but has some significant relation to the corporation, such
as a member of a law firm or investment bank which handles a significant amount of the
corporation's business.
25 ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.03.
26 Id. § 3.04.
27 Id.
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suggests that smaller publicly held companies have audit committees,28
and that as a rule all publicly held companies have nominating commit-
tees29 and compensation committees.30 Both committees should be com-
posed entirely of nonemployee directors and have a majority of
unaffiliated directors. 3' Thus, the Project would place unaffiliated di-
rectors in a position to exert substantial influence over a corporation's
(1) senior executives, (2) financial reports, (3) nomination of directors,
and (4) executive compensation arrangements.
The Project's structural recommendations are well within the
mainstream of current thinking about boards of directors.3 2 A board
comprised primarily of unaffiliated directors may contribute to corpo-
rate governance in several respects:
-A board can improve the quality of managers' business decisions.
Unaffiliated directors can help managers reach better decisions by
forcing them to present their recommendations lucidly, by asking
probing questions, and by drawing upon their own diverse exper-
iences, even though these directors may not share management's un-
derstanding of specific transactions or strategic choices. 33
- A board can facilitate needed changes in executive personnel. A
board has unique access to information about who makes corporate
decisions and how they are made. It is in the best position to evaluate
a corporation's senior executives, promote those who are most capa-
ble, and remove the incompetent.
- A board can improve the integrity of a corporation's financial
reports. Unaffiliated directors usually have less incentive than do a
28 Id. § 3.05.
29 Id. § 3.06.
30 Id. § 3.07.
31 Id. §§ 3.06-.07.
32 The concept of monitoring boards of directors comprised primarily of unaffiliated
directors has been endorsed by legal scholars, see, e.g., Leech & Mundheim, The Outside Director
of the Publicly Held Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1799 (1976); Eisenberg, Legal Models ofManagement
Structure in the Modern Corporation.- Oftcers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375
(1975); but cf. Brudney, The Independent Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 597 (1982) (arguing that greater use of independent directors will not promote social
responsibility, integrity, or efficiency); Branson, supra note 6, at 97-101; business school re-
searchers, see, e.g., Andrews, Directors' responsibility for corporate strategy, HARV. Bus. REV., Nov.-
Dec. 1980, at 30; Lewis, Choosing and Using Outside Directors, HARv. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1974,
at 70; the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, see Committee on Cor-
porate News, Corporate Directors' Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1619-30 (1978); Committee on
Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAw. 1837 (1979);
and The Business Roundtable, see Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2107-13 (1978).
33 SeeJ. Lynch, Activating the Board of Directors: A Study of the Process of Increasing
Board Effectiveness 340-41 (1979) (Harv. Bus. School doctoral dissertation). Because outside
directors are less involved in their corporations than are the managers, the outside directors
are less likely to screen out relevant information due to a phenomenon similar to cognitive
dissonance called "irreversible investment." See Arrow, On the Agenda of Organizations, in THE
CORPORATE SoCIETY 214, 228 (R. Marris ed. 1974).
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corporation's executives to engage in "cute accounting" 34 so as to dis-
tort a corporation's reported financial results. Directors can select the
corporation's public accountants and insulate them from manage-
ment's demands, in order to promote full and accurate disclosure of
the corporation's financial situation and the results of its operations.
- A board can deter unfair self-dealing, and can prevent manage-
ment from receiving excessive compensation. Unaffiliated directors
can reach informed judgments about the fairness of proposed transac-
tions between corporations and affiliated persons. They have the
power, de facto if not de jure, to veto such transactions. 35 Similarly,
they possess both the information and the authority to evaluate senior
executives' performance and to structure compensation arrangements
that will encourage efficient executive performance.
A substantial body of behavioral research suggests that boards com-
posed primarily of unaffiliated directors, because they tend to behave
more as peer groups than as hierarchical bodies, are likely to make bet-
ter decisions than boards composed primarily of management direc-
tors.3 6 Other studies indicate that subordinate executives usually are
passive directors, thus creating hierarchical boards. The response of one
inside director to a question about his role in a key board decision is
typical: "I don't worry too much about the 'director's role'-when the
guy you report to is the chairman [of the board], nobody really expects
to hear your private opinions anyway. '37
Professor Scott objects to the ALI's proposals concerning boards of
directors, commenting: "From [an] economic perspective, the ALI posi-
tion seems dubious at best."'38 He suggests that boards composed of
outside directors may be more capable of "passive" than of "active"
monitoring, and that boards composed of inside directors might better
serve shareholders' interests.3 9 In his view, empirical study is needed to
answer both questions.4°
Professor Scott's distinction between active and passive boards
seems overstated; thus, the basis of his objection to the ALI model is not
clear. Professor Scott describes the ALI's "active model" as one in
34 Treadway, Accounting Shenanigans and the Commission's 1984 Response 3 (1984)
(remarks to Financial Executives Institute).
35 Courts are likely to attach great weight to opinions of independent directors that a
conflict-of-interest transaction is unfair. Affiliated persons, aware of that possibility, are not
likely to press for transactions disapproved by such directors.
36 See Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board.- Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80
MICH. L. REv. 1 (1981) (reviewing relevant research in behavioral sciences).
37 See Levy, Remco Metals and Refining 3 (Harv. Bus. School Case No. 0-381-129,
1981).
38 Scott, supra note 6, at 934.
39 Professor Scott believes that the investment of time and knowledge necessary for in-
formed participation in the formulation of corporate policy is far more likely to be made by
inside directors. Id
40 Id. at 934-35.
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which "the board selects management, reviews and approves major cor-
porate plans and policies, observes trends and performance, and holds
management accountable for producing adequate results." 41 His postu-
lated "passive model" would substitute "rendering advice and sugges-
tions but ratifying the course management determines to pursue" 42 for
"review[ing] major corporate plans and policies."'43 Surely Professor
Scott does not intend to suggest that a board formally renounce its right
to approve corporate plans and policies, with the result that it always
will ratify management's recommendations regardless of management's
reaction to directors' advice and suggestions.44 But unless Professor Scott
intends to go that far, the distinction he draws between "active" and
"'passive" monitoring is merely one of emphasis.
How "active" or "passive" any given board should be depends on a
variety of circumstances. 45 The thrust of the ALI Project's recommen-
dations is to allow each board to monitor management as actively or as
passively as it thinks appropriate. These recommendations appear unob-
jectionable, unless, as may be the case with Professor Scott, one is con-
cerned that they increase directors' potential liability for breach of the
duty of care.46
Professor Scott's argument about inside versus outside directors is
based largely on studies showing no correlation between changes from
inside to outside boards or from one board organizational structure to
another, and corporations' economic performance or stock prices. 47
These studies do not constitute convincing evidence that outside direc-
tors cannot improve corporate performance. They are based on the
premise that all directors who meet certain objective criteria of indepen-
dence, and all boards that have certain committees comprised of certain
kinds of directors, are alike. This premise may well reflect the ALI Pro-
ject's thinking about boards of directors, but it is false.
Every board of directors has certain unique characteristics, as does
every board-management relationship. Moreover, every board and
board-management relationship changes over time. A board that fails
41 Id at 934 (citation omitted).
42 Id. at 935.
43 Id. at 934 (citation omitted).
44 Id at 934-35. Professor Scott's description of the role of passive directors as "ex post
facto monitoring" seems ill-advised. The logical extension of such a role would seem to be a
board powerless to prevent a transaction disastrous to the corporation.
45 See J. Lynch, supra note 33, at 329-3 1.
46 The Business Roundtable is concerned that the recommendations will become the
basis for holdings that directors and boards not organized in accord with those recommenda-
tions are operating in violation of the duty of care. See ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note
5; see also Andrews, Rigid rles will not make good boards, HARV. Bus. Rev., Nov.-Dec. 1982, at
34.
47 See MacAvoy, ALI Proposals for Increased Control of the Corporation by the Board of Directors:
An Economic Analysis, Exhibit C in ROUNDTABLE STATEMENT, supra note 5, at C-26. Professor
Scott proposes a study of stock prices. Scott, supra note 6, at 934-35.
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to comply with the ALI's structural recommendations may be less likely
to perform effectively, but formal compliance with those recommenda-
tions will not guarantee improved performance. A board comprised en-
tirely of inside directors may contribute more to a corporation's well-
being than a board of unaffiliated directors who are uninterested in ef-
fective monitoring.4 8
Professor Scott's argument and the economic studies he cites high-
light the difficulty of using objective indicia of board membership or
organization to predict how any given board will perform. Directors'
competence, integrity, and commitment is the key to effective board
performance 4 9 and predictions about how directors will behave vary
greatly, as recent statements by Irwin Borowski and Richard W. Due-
senberg demonstrate. Mr. Borowski, who dealt with many corporations
that had issued false financial reports or had made questionable pay-
ments to foreign government officials during the years he served as Asso-
ciate Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, is openly skeptical:
The [outside] director . . . may get most of the benefits of position
simply from being a director. Consequently, he will do those things
that make him attractive as a directorial candidate. These things may
include being easy to get along with, not rocking the boat, and gener-
ally being favorably disposed to management's interests. 50
Mr. Duesenberg, who is vice president, general counsel, and secre-
tary of Monsanto Corporation, thinks much more highly of directors
and managers:
To believe that boards and managers consciously skirt close to the
margin of illegality or moral turpitude to achieve private aggrandize-
ment or gain competitive advantage is to indulge in fantasy ....
Directors and managers of American enterprises are products of the
same culture as other professionals, including lawyers, judges, and law
professors, and their integrity and sense of justice and injustice are no
less finely tuned, nor more flawed in execution. 5 1
48 Professor Scott, in his discussion of "passive" and "active" boards, assumes that a
board that adopts the active mode of operation will contribute more than a board that adopts
the passive mode. See Scott, supra note 6, at 934-35. But a researcher cannot ascertain, on the
basis of publicly available data, whether any given board is monitoring management pas-
sively or actively, or how carefully it is reviewing management's performance. Professor Scott
also acknowledges implicitly, in his discussion of special litigation committees and their power
to dismiss derivative suits, that compliant outside directors, with their power to dismiss even
breach of loyalty suits with shareholder approval, may impose costs on a corporation that
inside directors could not impose. See id. at 944-45.
49 An additional important factor is the chief executive officer's attitude toward the
board. See J. Lynch, supra note 33, at 333-34.
50 Borowski, Corporate Accountability: The Role of the Independent Director, 9 J. CORP. L. 455,
461 (1984) (footnote omitted).
51 Duesenberg, The BusinessJudgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View From the
Inside, 60 WASH. U.L.Q. 311, 332 (1982).
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Both Mr. Borowski and Mr. Duesenberg no doubt are right about
some directors and wrong about others. The only prediction likely to
receive widespread support is that directors' performance will vary.
This truism, however, is far from trivial. It suggests that corporate law
can do little to ensure that competent and committed people will serve as
unaffiliated directors or that those who do serve will perform
adequately. 52
An economist would say that the ALI Project aspires to have unaf-
filiated directors produce positive externalities-benefits greater in value
than the consideration they receive for serving on corporate boards.53
Both economic and legal analysts long have recognized the difficulty in
using the law, an essentially coercive force, to stimulate the production
of positive externalities.54 The ALI Project should recognize this reality
and desist threatening liability in a futile attempt to stimulate the devel-
opment of effective boards of directors.
The Project also should acknowledge that a director will not neces-
sarily be an effective monitor simply because he has no identifiable affili-
ation with a corporation and no direct or indirect financial interest in a
transaction he is reviewing. Similarly, the Project should acknowledge
that although boards and board committees comprised largely of unaf-
filiated directors may be more likely to protect shareholder interests
than those comprised of inside directors, unaffiliated boards frequently
will do little more than rubber-stamp management's recommenda-
tions.55
Nevertheless, the ALI Project should not withdraw or modify its
specific proposals concerning the membership and organization of cor-
52 See Weiss, supra note 9, at 442-43. The most important and least surmountable prob-
lem that the ALI Corporate Governance Project faces is to ensure that capable persons are
placed in the corporate governance system. The key to improved corporate governance and
accountability is not the structure suggested by the ALI per se, but the operation of that
structure through effective boards selecting and overseeing effective managers.
53 SeeT. WHISLER, RULES OF THE GAME, Rule IV(E) (1984) ("No company will offer a
director's fee that, in itself, is adequate compensation for your time.").
54 See A. HIRSCHMAN, SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS (1982) (discussing factors that lead
people to attempt to produce positive externalities through public service).
55 See, e.g., Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (outside directors, in-
cluding a former U.S. Attorney General, unquestioningly approved very generous "golden
parachute" compensation plan before details of plan were finalized, and subsequently ap-
proved proxy statement that conveyed misleading impression they had approved plan only
after due deliberation); Chandler, Letter to Editor, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 184
(letter from retired chairman of Northern Ill. Gas Co.) ("[M]y impression has been that the
proportion of outsiders on boards has improved [since 1975], but little else has."). The former
general counsel of General Electric Company suggested that most outside directors view serv-
ice on boards from their perspective as executives of other corporations and, consequently, are
reluctant to restrict materially other executives' powers and prerogatives. See Estes, The Case
For Counsel to Outside Directors, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 125, 127. Also, because
corporate chief executives often control the nominating process, they may tend to pick pas-
sive, or "sympathetic," directors. See Lewis, supra note 32, at 71.
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porate boards of directors.56 Those proposals are largely aspirational in
character, and statements of aspirations are useful.57
On the other hand, the ALI Project should not provide more com-
prehensive guidance to corporate boards. Most problems boards face
are too subtle, too complex, and too often derived from peculiar circum-
stances to allow for relatively uniform responses. General guidance,
even if provided in aspirational terms, is apt to accomplish little.5 8
There may well be a need for an organization devoted to helping corpo-
rate directors identify, understand, and resolve problems they face,59 but
the ALI Project has neither the mandate nor the expertise to be that
organization.
The Project's mission, in addition to identifying the role of boards
of directors, is to set forth rules to govern shareholder/manager relation-
ships. The foregoing discussion of boards of directors suggests two crite-
ria the ALI should use to evaluate those rules. First, the ALI should
focus on whether any given rule will outlaw clearly unacceptable behav-
ior or will deal with problems caused by passive, rubber-stamp boards-
not whether the rule will promote truly effective board performance.
Second, the ALI should consider whether the rule will discourage com-
petent people from serving as outside directors or will impede boards'
efforts to monitor management's performance. It is in terms of these
criteria that this Article comments on the ALI's proposals relating to the
duty of care, the duty of loyalty, transactions affecting control, and dis-
closure of corporate information.
II
DUTY OF CARE
Directors are charged with a duty to perform their functions in a
manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of their corpo-
ration, using the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reason-
ably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
56 A possible exception would be the proposed requirement that large publicly held corpo-
rations have audit committees composed of outside directors, a majority of whom would have
to be unaffiliated. See ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 3.03. It might better be framed as a
recommendation.
57 Manning, supra note 7, suggests that a largely aspirational "duty of attention" be
substituted for the duty of care.
58 The American Bar Association included Ethical Considerations within the Code of
Professional Responsibility in an attempt to provide such aspirational guidance. See Frankel,
Review, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 874, 876-82 (1976). Most lawyers viewed this effort as a failure,
and no such statements are included in the revised Code.
59 Although directors' responsibilities resemble those of professionals, surprisingly little
has been written concerning how directors should deal with problematic situations. No forum
to research or discuss these issues exists.
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circumstances. 60 A director will not ordinarily be held liable for falling
short of this standard. In fact, only in a situation in which a director has
almost totally abdicated his supervisory responsibilities does he run any
significant risk of liability for a breach of the duty of care.61
Courts are reluctant to subject directors-particularly outside di-
rectors-to due care liability. A number of factors explain this reluc-
tance. First, courts realize that no person is obligated to serve as a
corporate director, especially an outside director. If corporate law
threatened directors who failed to perform at the level of the law's aspi-
rations with liability, "no men [or women] of sense would take the office
. "62 Second, shareholders, as equity investors, can be viewed as
having assumed the risk that managers will make some bad judgments
resulting in business losses. Third, fact-finders viewing situations retro-
spectively too often may be inclined to determine that a bad result was
due to bad judgment rather than bad luck. Finally, the threat of liabil-
ity may lead directors or managers to avoid potentially profitable but
risky business oppportunities or to focus on safeguarding corporate
resources.
63
The critical choice with regard to the duty of care is whether to
maintain the status quo, whether to increase the threat of due care lia-
bility, or whether to abolish liability for breach of the duty. The ALl
Project proposes rules that would minimize the possibility of director
liability in derivative suits challenging a board's considered decisions,
but would increase substantially the threat of liability for errors of omis-
sion.64 Professor Scott, on the other hand, argues that "very . . . little
would be lost by outright abolition of the legal duty of care and its ac-
companying threat of a lawsuit," 65 and that substantial doctrinal bene-
fits might result.66
60 ALl Draft No. 3, supra note I, § 4.01, states the duty of care in these terms, as do
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 35 (1980) and numerous other statutes.
61 Professor Bishop's 16-year-old observation, that searching for cases in which corporate
directors have been held liable for negligence uncomplicated by self-dealing is a "search for a
very small number of needles in a very large haystack," remains valid. See Bishop, Sitting
Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnifiation ofCorporate Directors and Ofiers, 77 YALE
L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). See also Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence,
1972 DUKE LJ. 895, 919 (1972). Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 NJ. 15, 432 A.2d 814
(1981), much cited by the ALI Project, is remarkable not because a director was actually held
liable, but as an illustration of the difficulty courts find in imposing due care liability on
directors. The Francis director abdicated all her directorial responsibilities for a period of
years, allowing her sons (related parties) to loot the corporation. The court held that by
virtue of her office, the director had the power to prevent the losses, and had breached her
duty to the corporation by her neglect. Id. at 45, 432 A.2d at 829.
62 Barnes v. Andrews, 298 Fed. 614, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
63 Scott, supra note 6, at 935-37, notes these factors, as does Judge Winter in joy v.
North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982).
64 ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01.
65 See Scott, supra note 6, at 937.
66 Id
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Professor Scott's position appears more worthy of support. The ALI
Project's proposals, except insofar as they represent statements of aspira-
tion, seem likely to produce few benefits and to generate substantial
costs. Boards of directors reach most decisions as part of an ongoing
process, rather than through quasi-adjudicatory consideration of partic-
ular situations.6 7 Moreover, boards in general, and outside directors in
particular, devote limited amounts of time to any given corporation's
affairs. In light of these realities, it is easy to characterize any board
action or inaction as the product of a considered judgment, even if it is
only a judgment as to which kinds of decisions should be on the board's
agenda and which should be delegated to management. 6 8
The ALI Project's proposals do not allay substantially the concerns
that courts traditionally have expressed when declining to hold directors
liable for losses produced by transactions from which they obtained no
personal benefits. Thus, courts probably will continue to seize on the
possibility that directors made an informed decision as a basis for excul-
pating from liability directors whose conduct arguably involved some
negligent failure to act carefully.6 9 Only in instances where directors
have come close to abdicating totally will the ALI's proposals make im-
position of liability somewhat more likely.70
Adoption of the ALI Project's proposals almost certainly will gener-
ate substantial costs, however. Plaintiffs probably will bring more
"strike suits" claiming breaches of the duty of care. It is relatively easy
to frame a claim that directors were negligent (or grossly negligent) in
failing to inform themselves of some material fact or to authorize some
protective action, and relatively difficult to dispose of such claims with-
out a trial on the merits. 7' The threat of strike suits, even though they
are unlikely to succeed, will encourage all directors-whether diligent or
67 See Manning, supra note 7, at 1483 ("The lawyer's professional experience in courts,
legislatures, and semi-political bodies tends to lead him to assume that all decisional process is
inevitably made up of a series of discrete, separate issues presented one at a time, debated by
both or all sides, and voted on. In fact boards of directors do not operate that way at all [and
a]ctions are usually by consensus.").
68 See ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01(a) comment g(1) (" 'Oversight choices' (e.g.,
an informed decision to review aspect 'x' of a business instead of aspect 'y') . . . should be
protected by the business judgment rule.").
69 In Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984), the Delaware Supreme Court asserted
that a distinction should be drawn between a board's conscious and unconscious failures to
act, but also acknowledged that cases involving unconscious failures to act "have been adjudi-
cated upon concepts of business judgment." Id. at 813 n.7.
70 Set, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
71 An illustrative example, inspired by a recent news report, would be a suit against the
directors of Marsh and McLennan alleging that they should have taken steps to prevent the
company's chief money market trader from entering into speculative transactions that re-
sulted in more than $100 million in losses. See N.Y. Times, May 3, 1984, at D1, col. 5. The
ALI Project also would provide plaintiffs with significant grounds for questioning whether
directors have relied appropriately on officers, experts, employees, board committees, and
others. ALl Draft No. 3, supra note 1, §§ 4.02-.03.
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not-to devote more time and resources to precautionary measures.
The threat also may deter some qualified people from serving as outside
directors.
Professor Scott recognizes some of these costs, and also points out
that economic analysis suggests that the benefits gained by threatening
directors with due care liability are rather small. 72 With respect to
transactions between the corporation and unrelated parties, the interests
of directors and officers align with the interests of shareholders; both
groups seek profits, and neither gains from bad business judgments or
from subordinates' misuse or defalcation of corporate resources. 73
Both the market for corporate control and the market for corporate
managers tend to reward managers who increase corporate profits and
to penalize managers who do not. 74 Although neither market is per-
fectly efficient or instantly responsive, the threat of liability for breaches
of the duty of care, as suggested by the ALI Project, will do little to
enhance the impact or responsiveness of either market. Directors who
simply go through the motions of staying informed about corporate af-
fairs and reviewing management's proposals will contribute little more
to the enhancement of corporate profits than will directors who ignore
their corporations' affairs. Moreover, eliminating the threat of directors'
due care liability does not require exculpating officers who misuse cor-
porate resources. Those officers also have responsibilities as agents of
their corporation, and could be held liable under principles of agency
law.75
More importantly, eliminating the right of shareholders to bring
72 See Scott, supra note 6, at 932-37.
73 A secondary thrust of the ALI recommendations is to increase the threat the directors
will be held liable for losses caused when a board approves unlawful corporate conduct it
knows or should know is unlawful, or fails to take reasonable action to deter corporate em-
ployees from engaging in unlawful conduct. See ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 4.01. The
Project's approach to this subject is based implicitly on a view that corporations should be
expected to behave lawfully, and that shareholders should be empowered to enforce this ex-
pectation. As to the first expectation, the Project accomplishes its goal by framing the objec-
tives of corporate activity in such a manner as to make clear that corporations cannot defend
unlawful conduct on grounds of an absolute obligation to maximize profits. See ALI Draft
No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01. As to the goal of enabling shareholders to enforce the corporate
obligation of lawful behavior, it is questionable why corporate law, rather than criminal law,
and shareholder-plaintiffs, rather than public prosecutors, should enforce these obligations
against corporate directors. A better approach might be to revamp the relevant criminal laws
if they are ineffective. See COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 261-63 (remarks of A.A. Sommer,
Jr.).
74 When managers make bad business judgments, the price of their corporation's stock
will decline. Third parties or current shareholders then are likely to find it financially attrac-
tive to acquire control of their firms, by way ofstock acquisitions and/or solicitation of voting
support from other shareholders, and to replace management. See Manne, Mergers and the
Marketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110 (1965); in/ra notes 120-26 and accompanying
text. The market for corporate managers determines managers' compensation. See Fama,
Agenc Problems and the Theog ofthe Fin, 88 J. POL. EcoN. 288, 295 (1980).
75 See, e.g., Garden Hill Estates, Inc. v. Bernstein, 24 A.D.2d 512, 261 N.Y.S.2d 648
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suits charging breach of the duty of care would simplify the develop-
ment of rules for other aspects of the corporate governance system. Pro-
fessor Scott explains how eliminating the threat of duty of care "strike
suits" would allow the derivative suit to become a more effective device
for enforcing the duty of loyalty.76 Abolishing the largely academic dis-
tinction between a minimal threat of due care liability and no threat at
all also would demonstrate clearly that the corporate governance system
relies not on litigation but on the market for corporate control, supple-
mented by the corporate electoral system, to regulate directors' decisions
about transactions between their corporations and unrelated parties. Fi-
nally, consideration of substantive duty of loyalty rules, in terms of how
conflicts of interest should be regulated, would be facilitated by elimi-
nating the largely ephemeral notion that shareholder interests are pro-
tected because "directors and officers . . have a fiduciary duty (with
attendant legal liabilities) to the [c]orporation and all of its shareholders
to act in their interests. ' 77 The sections that follow consider duty of
loyalty rules and the market for control.
III
DUTY OF LOYALTY
Although the interests of managers and shareholders generally co-
incide regarding transactions between corporations and unrelated par-
ties, the same cannot be said with regard to transactions between
managers and their corporations or transactions in which managers ex-
ploit properties or opportunities rightfully belonging to their corpora-
tions. Managers who participate in such transactions often will realize
personal financial gains that far outweigh the indirect losses they will
incur if the transactions cause corporate profits to drop.
If investors operated in a perfectly informed market and had no
transaction costs, they could handle the problem posed by these conflicts
of interest by anticipating all opportunities for managerial self-enrich-
ment, contracting comprehensively with managers to establish the terms
on which they could exploit such opportunities, and enforcing those
contracts. But perfect foresight is unattainable, and contracting, moni-
toring, and enforcement are expensive. A more realistic and economical
approach is to subject managers-directors, senior executives, and con-
trolling shareholders-to a fiduciary duty of loyalty enforced by the
threat of liability.78
No dispute exists over the utility of a duty of loyalty or its quasi-
(1965), afid, 17 N.Y.2d 525, 267 N.Y.S.2d 906, 215 N.E.2d 163 (1967) (holding former presi-
dent liable to corporation for losses caused by his misconduct).
76 Scott, supra note 6, at 937.
77 Abrams v. Mayflower Investors, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 316, 369 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
78 See Williamson, supra note 9, at 1540-46.
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contractual substance. Managers should arrange transactions with their
corporations, as well as transactions involving properties or opportuni-
ties to which they have access as a result of their corporate positions, on
terms as favorable to their corporations as terms negotiated in compara-
ble arm's length transactions involving unrelated parties. The key issue
is how to enforce the duty of loyalty. 79
The mere existence of a duty of loyalty does not eliminate manag-
ers' incentive to enrich themselves at the expense of their corporations.
It does, however, inspire managers to frustrate enforcement of the duty
by making it appear that no breach has occurred. The fact that most
shareholders own only a small proportion of a company's stock enhances
the prospect that such tactics will succeed, because those shareholders
have little incentive to incur the cost of closely monitoring management
conduct or of maintaining derivative lawsuits to recover corporate
losses.
Two economic pressures limit managers' self-aggrandizing behav-
ior. First, investors protect themselves by discounting the price they will
pay for a corporation's stock. Discounting serves as a gross limitation on
breaches of the duty of loyalty, because a decline in share prices can
result in increased costs of capital or, ultimately, in a change in control.
Managers presumably indulge in self-enriching transactions only when
they believe their benefits will exceed their losses from higher costs of
capital and reduced corporate profits. The threat of a change of control
perhaps constitutes a more substantial constraint on managerial disloy-
alty, but it nonetheless allows for a significant amount of improper self-
dealing. Takeover bids are expensive and managerial depredations
therefore must be substantial before the resulting stock price decline
makes such a bid attractive. When those engaging in self-dealing are
majority owners, no change in control can occur without their consent.
In other situations, the potential gains to managers from self-dealing
may exceed the potential cost of losing their positions of control.80
The second factor limiting managers' self-aggrandizing behavior is
the threat that attorneys interested in earning fees for representing
shareholder-plaintiffs will detect breaches of the duty of loyalty and will
finance derivative suits. Professor Scott suggests that the ALI Project
recognize that plaintiffs' attorneys typically are the real parties in inter-
79 This Article does not assume that every manager tries to deal unfairly with his corpo-
ration. The duty of loyalty, and its associated threat of liability, is directed at managers who
try to enrich themselves at corporate expense. Managers are less disposed to behave improp-
erly in duty of care transactions, where their interests and those of the corporation usually
coincide, than they are in duty of loyalty transactions, where their interests conflict with those
of the corporation.
80 Cf. Scott, supra note 6, at 937-38 (explaining that managers generally "may set terms
more favorable to [themselves] than would prevail on the open market or in an independent
bargain").
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est in derivative suits alleging breaches of the duty of loyalty and en-
courage attorneys to maintain such suits. 81 He supports more generous
compensation for attorneys who win duty of loyalty suits and elimina-
tion of procedural barriers to derivative suits.8 2
Derivative suits can effectively deter breaches of the duty of loyalty
only if the substantive rules governing duty of loyalty transactions make
it likely courts will identify improper self-dealing. Determining whether
any given self-dealing transaction is improper often is difficult. The
transactions that kindle duty of loyalty lawsuits usually do not involve
property or services with readily ascertainable market prices.8 3 Thus,
courts must formulate hypothetical terms for transactions that unrelated
parties dealing at arm's length would have agreed upon.
Courts can determine the "fairness" of a particular transaction by
focusing on how the transaction was arranged, the substance of the
transaction, or some combination of the two. The ALI Project recom-
mends a combined approach, designed to encourage "independent
decisionmakers" to represent corporations in conflict-of-interest transac-
tions.8 4 In cases involving disinterested directors, the ALI would require
a shareholder challenging a conflict-of-interest transaction to prove the
directors lacked any reasonable basis for approving the transaction.8 5
Where disinterested shareholders approved the transaction, the ALI
would require a shareholder-plaintiff to prove the transaction involved
"waste."18 6 Absent approval by an independent decisionmaker, a plain-
tiff's proof that there was a conflict-of-interest transaction would shift to
the party defending the transaction the burden of proving that the
terms of the transaction were "fair. '8 7
In an apparent effort to increase shareholders' opportunities to
challenge conflict-of-interest transactions, the ALI also proposes author-
81 Id at 940-41; see also Weiss, Disclosure and Corporate Accountability, 34 Bus. LAW. 575, 586
(1969) (awards of attorneys' fees "make it economically attractive for shareholders, or share-
holders' counsel," to maintain derivative suits).
82 Scott, supra note 6, at 941-45. Scott mentions in a footnote that "for most effective
enforcement, the recovery in its entirety should go to the attorney--a thought too horrible to
contemplate for at least another decade." Id. at 941 n.43.
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., the reporter for the remedies section of the ALI Project,
also co-authored an article that discussed the use of derivative suits as a deterrent to breaches
of the duty of loyalty. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation
and a Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 261 (1981).
83 But see Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (transaction involved
inventory of leaf tobacco, market value of which could be readily ascertained).
84 ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 5.08 comment a.
85 Id § 5.08(a)(2)(A).
86 Id. § 5.08(a)(2)(B).
87 Id. § 5.08(b). This Article focuses on § 5.08, which covers managers' contracts with
their corporations. The ALI Project proposes to use substantially the same approach with
regard to all duty of loyalty transactions except those involving executive compensation. See
id. § 5.08 comment c.
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izing shareholders to bring suits challenging the adequacy of managers'
disclosures.8 8 Upon finding that a manager had not disclosed all mate-
rial facts to the individuals who authorized a conflict-of-interest transac-
tion, a court could void the transaction, even if it was fair. The court
then could order appropriate relief, unless the manager subsequently
had disclosed all material facts and independent directors or sharehold-
ers had ratified the transaction.89
The ALI Project's approach is ill-conceived. With regard to in-
dependent director approval of conflict-of-interest transactions, the rec-
ommendation to shift the burden of proof and change the standard of
review is based implicitly on two beliefs: first, that courts are able and
willing to determine directors' independence; second, that directors who
qualify as "independent" consistently will represent corporations effec-
tively in conflict-of-interest situations. Neither belief is well-founded.
Independence, in the sense of having a commitment to and a ca-
pacity for making decisions uninfluenced by personal, professional, or
collegial relationships, is more a function of a director's character than
of objective criteria.90 The courts, however, have insisted on using
bright-line tests of financial interest to determine whether outside direc-
tors are independent, particularly when those directors are "upright, re-
sponsible leaders in the business and civic communities." 9' Courts may
have legitimate concerns about damaging directors' reputations for in-
tegrity. They also may fear discouraging qualified people from serving
on boards by subjecting them to searching inquiries. In any event,
courts are not likely to pursue aggressively even the limited subjective
inquiry the ALI proposes-whether a director has "a business relation-
ship that is sufficiently substantial that it would reasonably be expected
to affect his judgment with respect to the transaction in question in a
manner adverse to the corporation. '92
There is little reason to be confident directors who pass the ALI
88 Id. § 5.08.
89 Id. § 5.08 comment c.
90 See text accompanying supra notes 49-52.
91 In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075, 1084 (6th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting plaintiff's effort to question independence of two outside directors, where one also
was corporation's outside counsel and other was consultant to corporation); see also Maldo-
nado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 795 (2d Cir. 1979) (director "disinterested" for purposes of Rule
lOb-5 of Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 "if he has no material personal interest in the
transaction or matter under consideration"); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979) (members of special litigation committee had no prior
affiliation with corporation and were not directors prior to challenged transactions, thus elim-
inating independence as an issue of fact).
92 ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 5.01(a)(2). The ALI combines this subjective test
with objective tests involving familial and financial relationships. Id. § 5.01(a). It also de-
fines, somewhat more broadly, those persons who will be deemed "interested" in a transac-
tion. See ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 1.19; see also id. § 1.26 (defining when a director has
a "significant relationship" with the senior executives of a corporation).
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Project's test of independence will represent corporations effectively in
conflict-of-interest situations. As with cases involving duty of care, the
Project has allowed its aspirations concerning the conduct of effective
directors to color its judgments concerning minimum standards of per-
formance. Professor Victor Brudney summarized the factors that make
it difficult for even reasonably diligent directors to deal effectively with
conflict-of-interest situations: "[l]imited access to information, limited
incentives and sanctions, and the constraints of the boardroom context
against a background of social and economic relationships with mem-
bers of management. '93 In some cases, ostensibly disinterested directors
may not desire to act independently; they may be little more than syco-
phants, prepared to rubber-stamp virtually any transaction recom-
mended by senior executives or controlling shareholders. 94 But in all
conflict-of-interest situations where ostensibly disinterested directors are
involved, the ALI proposes that courts review those directors' decisions
using a standard comparable to the business judgment rule. This ap-
proach creates a potential for substantial exploitation.
The ALI's proposal concerning independent shareholder approval
is troublesome for a different reason. Most shareholders of public corpo-
rations will acquiesce in management's recommendations concerning al-
most any transaction submitted to them for approval. Search costs are
too high for most minority shareholders to investigate those transactions
sufficiently to decide if they are fair. Notions of "corporate democracy"
or shareholder sovereignty have blinded courts to this reality.95 Those
same notions seem to have led the ALI Project to attach too much
weight to shareholder approval or ratification of conflict-of-interest
transactions.96
Finally, the ALI's proposal that shareholders be allowed to chal-
lenge the adequacy of managers' disclosures concerning conflict-of-inter-
93 Brudney, supra note 32, at 622. See also Marsh, Are Directors Trutwees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35,
36-39 (1966) (potential for bias lay behind 19th century prohibition against transactions be-
tween directors and their corporations).
94 See supra note 55.
95 See Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979) (ratification of transaction by
disinterested shareholders shifts burden of proof to plaintiff to show lack of consideration); see
also Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 415 n.16 (1983)
(asserting that tradition explains rules concerning shareholder voting on corporate
transactions).
96 One also can question the success of the ALI's effort to articulate three separate stan-
dards for review of duty of loyalty transactions. The first, reasonable belief that a transaction
was fair, is described as "an objective standard which adopts the concept of an arm's-length
bargain .. . to establish a 'range of reasonableness."' ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1,
§ 5.08(a)(2)(A) comment. The second, waste, depends on whether any "person of ordinary
sound business judgment would say that the consideration received by the corporation was
...fair." Id § 5.08(a)(2)(B) comment. The third, fairness, is again described by reference to
an arm's-length transaction. Id. § 5.08(a) (2) (C) comment. These definitions do not clearly
delineate the factual situations to which they would apply. It is not clear what set of facts
would fall within, or without, only one of these definitions.
19841]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW[
est transactions is problematic in two ways. First, decisions about
whether full disclosure was made, which largely depend on whether un-
disclosed facts were "material" or were "known to" the manager in-
volved,9 7 are likely to become proxies for decisions about the substantive
fairness of conflict-of-interest transactions at issue. Courts are particu-
larly likely to take such liberties where approval of the transaction by
independent directors or shareholders precludes judicial inquiries into
substantive fairness.98 Rules that force courts to decide questions of fair-
ness in terms of proxy issues frequently lead to unprincipled decision-
making, lack of predictability, and excessive litigation. Illustrative is the
Delaware courts' recently abandoned effort to regulate the fairness of
cash-out mergers by focusing on whether the purpose of such mergers
was to eliminate minority shareholders, an inevitable result of all such
mergers.99 If the ALI's intent is to protect shareholders against unfair
self-dealing by managers, the Project should recommend that courts fo-
cus on the real issue of fairness, not on the proxy issue of disclosure.
Second, allowing derivative suits alleging inadequate disclosure in-
vites nonmeritorious claims that cannot be disposed of without extensive
(and expensive) pre-trial proceedings. Only after a plaintiff's lawyer has
carefully examined a manager's files and deposed the manager does the
lawyer have sufficient information to conclude that the manager did not
know some undisclosed material fact in a conflict-of-interest transaction.
Moreover, the ALI Project does not eliminate this danger with its pro-
posal that corporations be allowed to preclude such litigation by ratify-
ing the challenged transaction after considering the previously
undisclosed data."°° Counsel who initiate suits that lead to such disclo-
sure and reconsideration presumably will receive compensation for pro-
moting integrity in the corporate decisionmaking process. 1° 1 Thus, this
aspect of the ALI's proposal may lead to more nonmeritorious derivative
suits challenging the adequacy of disclosure, not to eliminating such
litigation.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the ALI Project should enforce
the duty of loyalty by telling courts to evaluate conflict-of-interest trans-
actions in terms of substantive fairness. There is no simple approach for
97 See id § 5.08(a) (1).
98 Cf R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION 886-89 (5th ed. 1982)
(commenting on pattern of court decisions involving challenges based on federal securities
law disclosure requirements).
99 For a synopsis of the Delaware case law, see Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Merg-
ers: The Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25-38 (1983).
100 Such reconsideration must be done by the person or persons who approved the trans-
action, ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 5.08(a)(1), which will make it particularly difficult to
cut off suits challenging transactions approved by a corporation's shareholders.
101 Cf Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970) (plaintiffs who estab-
lished violations of securities laws awarded attorneys' fees despite lack of express statutory
authorization).
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determining the terms on which a corporation would have entered into
a transaction with an independent party, however. Courts have been
reluctant to find a breach of the duty of loyalty unless a challenged
conflict-of-interest transaction obviously was unfair, which has led them
to treat "fairness" as a zone with ill-defined boundaries. Their approach
has created a potential for systematic exploitation because managers
have an incentive to structure conflict-of-interest transactions to fall just
within the zone of fairness. Moreover, when the transactions in question
recur frequently, as do executive compensation arrangements, manag-
ers' manipulation can shift both the mid-point and the boundaries of
the zone of fairness, creating a potential for steadily increasing
exploitation.
The ALI Project should take three steps to counter this potential
for exploitation. First, it should state, as a matter of black letter law,
that fairness is to be "measured by comparison with an arm's-length
transaction with an unrelated third party." 10 2 Second, it should propose
that a manager seeking to uphold a conflict-of-interest transaction
should bear the burden of proving the transaction was fair, as it now
proposes concerning transactions not approved by an "independent
decisionmaker." Finally, the ALI should recommend that if a manager
does not meet that burden, a court should treat a conflict-of-interest
transaction as voidable, or subject to appropriate equitable relief-such
as imposition of a constructive trust-that will "squeeze all possible
profits out of [that transaction]."103
A duty of loyalty rule with these characteristics, combined with
Professor Scott's suggested approach to derivative suits, would provide
plaintiffs' lawyers with powerful incentives to act as private attorneys
general, identifying and challenging unfair transactions between man-
agers and their corporations. This combination of rules, however, would
not necessarily lead to a sharp increase in derivative litigation. The
prospect of more derivative suits and the threat of losing all benefits
from unfair conflict-of-interest transactions-both unpalatable possibili-
ties--would provide managers a strong incentive to avoid both unfair
transactions and those at the outer bounds of the "fairness" zone.104
One hopes managers would arrange their transactions with their corpo-
rations on terms about which no questions of fairness could legitimately
102 ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 5.08(a)(2)(C) comment. Currently, the ALI Project
combines that definition with the following- "Whether the transaction affirmatively will be
in the corporation's best interest." Id.
103 Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir. 1943), cerl. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1944) (discussing computation of damages for violation of § 16(b) of the Securities and Ex-
change Act of 1934).
104 The fairness zone is the range of values for a given transaction that reasonable people,
dealing at arm's length, would be prepared to consider. Scott, supra note 6, at 939-40, de-
scribes this as the "contract range."
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be raised. 105
The proposed rule poses one question and gives rise to two reason-
able objections. 10 6 The question asks to which transactions or persons
should the duty of loyalty apply. Professor Scott criticizes current cor-
poration codes for using a definition of the duty of loyalty that "is both
too broad and too narrow."' 0 7 He suggests that the duty apply "only
with respect to those in actual control"10 8 of a corporation, because only
those persons can force acceptance of unfair bargains. The difficulty
with this suggestion is that defining who is capable of exercising "actual
control" poses a problem equally as daunting as defining who is "in-
dependent." In one sense, Professor Scott's definition is circular; it
posits the existence of an unfair conflict-of-interest transaction as evi-
dence of "actual control."
A better approach would use a slightly over-inclusive list of objec-
tive criteria to identify persons whose transactions with the corporation
will be governed by the duty of loyalty because of their direct or indirect
relationships with the corporation or its managers. As Professor Scott
has observed, over-inclusiveness should not cause serious problems; those
who do not have actual power to control a corporation generally cannot
compel it to enter into unfair transactions. Over-inclusiveness also will
ensure that anybody in a position to exercise control almost certainly
will be subject to the duty of loyalty.109
One reasonable objection to the proposed duty of loyalty rule is
that it does not give managers an incentive to have disinterested direc-
tors review conflict-of-interest transactions. The ALI Project could
adopt the proposed rule and quell this objection without requiring
courts to pass on directors' subjective independence. It could encourage
courts to treat the approval of a transaction by directors with no pecuni-
ary interest in that transaction as probative of its fairness, and to view a
manager's failure to obtain disinterested directors' approval of a con-
flict-of-interest transaction as an indication of unfairness. But since the
absence of a financial interest in a transaction cannot be equated with
subjective independence, the ALI should not instruct courts to treat dis-
105 The threat of liability thus would promote the underlying objective of the duty of
loyalty-ensuring that transactions between affiliates and their corporations are at terms
comparable to those that unrelated parties would agree to in similar transactions negotiated
at arm's length.
106 Counsel for The Business Roundtable have circulated a memorandum asserting that
the ALI proposal "would unnecessarily complicate many important corporate transactions."
Weil, Gotshal & Manges, A Status Report on the American Law Institute's Proposed Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 8 (1984) (unpublished
memorandum).
107 Scott, supra note 6, at 938.
108 Id.
109 Many other issues that relate to the duty of loyalty addressed by the ALl Project,
such as how corporate opportunities are to be defined, are outside the coverage of this Article.
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interested directors' approval as sufficient either to shift the burden of
proof or to change the standard for reviewing the substance of a
transaction.
A second objection to the proposed duty of loyalty rule is that it
would discourage mutually advantageous transactions between corpora-
tions and their managers. This objection is largely a makeweight with
regard to transactions between corporations and individual directors
and executives. These transactions usually involve routine business ar-
rangements, such as providing professional services or selling products in
the ordinary course of business, which easily can be arranged on terms
comparable to those available to third parties. In the relatively few
transactions that involve unique goods or services, an affiliate's stake in
the economic success of his corporation is likely to balance the risk that a
seemingly fair transaction will be held, after the fact, to have been
unfair." 0
A greater danger exists that the proposed duty of loyalty rule would
discourage mutually advantageous transactions between controlled sub-
sidiaries and their parent corporations. These transactions are common.
They frequently involve unique goods or services, such as rights in re-
search and development programs, for which market values are not
readily ascertainable. If parent companies are subjected to the proposed
duty of loyalty rule, they would be forced to choose among undesirable
alternatives-incurring substantial costs to document the fairness of all
transactions with their subsidiaries, defending numerous derivative suits
challenging those transactions, or eliminating the minority interests in
their subsidiaries.111
Corporate law should not compel such a choice, unless some reason
exists to treat corporations that maintain controlled, but not wholly
owned, subsidiaries with disfavor. 12 Parent-subsidiary relationships
vary. Allowing corporations to develop customized procedures for han-
dling transactions with their controlled subsidiaries should contribute
more to efficient operations than would be lost by imposing on investors
110 Executive compensation arrangements pose unique problems. Two recent articles an-
alyze recent trends in executive compensation. See Patton, Why So Many ChiefExecutives Make
Too Much, Bus. WK., Oct. 17, 1983, at 24; Drucker, Reform Executive Pay or Congress Will, Wall
St. J., Apr. 24, 1984, at 34, col. 3. The ALI proposes to approach this problem largely by
requiring disclosure to and approval by independent decisionmakers. The business judgment
rule would insulate their decision from review. See ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 5.09
comments a, c. This may be the best method of overseeing executive compensation, even
though it leaves compensation decisions largely to directors who share the recipients' interest
in ensuring corporate executives are compensated generously. See Vagts, Challenges to Executive
Compensation: For the Market or the Courts., 8 J. CORP. L. 231, 268-71 (1983).
''' In many respects, parent companies with controlled subsidiaries currently face such a
situation. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
112 Such relationships involve a potential for exploitation but are not inherently unfair.
Thus no sound reason exists to bar such relationships or saddle them with extraordinary
transaction costs.
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the costs of identifying, analyzing, and monitoring compliance with the
different standards used.1 3 Moreover, if investors in a controlled sub-
sidiary are on notice that the parent's transactions with the subsidiary
will not be reviewed under the proposed duty of loyalty rules, they can
protect themselves by discounting the price they will pay for the subsidi-
ary's stock.
If a parent corporation initiates changes in the duty of loyalty rule
governing its relationship with a controlled subsidiary with outstanding
minority interests, the minority shareholders should be afforded some
relief from the possible adverse impact of those changes. When those
shareholders purchased their stock, they might not have had any reason
to anticipate that the duty of loyalty rule would be changed. For exam-
ple, the subsidiary might have been an independent corporation.14
The best protection for minority shareholders' interests might be to
allow them to exercise appraisal rights when a parent company proposes
changing the duty of loyalty rule governing its relationship with a con-
trolled subsidiary." 5 If the parent company's suggested alternative does
no more than promote economies within the parent-subsidiary relation-
ship, the price of the subsidiary's stock should not decline, and minority
shareholders will have little incentive to pursue the appraisal remedy.
But if the alternative rule allows the parent substantial scope for exploit-
ing the subsidiary, the price of the subsidiary's shares should decline,
jeopardizing continued minority shareholder participation in the subsid-
iary and reducing the parent's ability to exploit the minority." 6
IV
CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
Transactions involving corporate control fall into two categories:
those in which control is sold, and those in which control is protected.
The duty of loyalty regulates transactions that sell control. 17 A person
selling a controlling interest in a corporation has no duty to ensure that
113 Corporations should not be allowed to adopt different duty of loyalty standards in
transactions with affiliated individuals. The cost to investors of identifying and analyzing
such standards probably outweighs any efficiency gains produced by the use of such stan-
dards. Cf. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (uniform interpretation of "boilerplate" clauses in bond
indentures contributes to efficient operation of capital markets).
114 One could argue that investors always should anticipate the possibility that the duty
of loyalty rule might change, and should deal with that possibility through a combination of
discounting and diversification. The disadvantage of this approach is that it would force all
corporations to bear the cost of such discounting.
115 The recently amended New York appraisal statute could serve as a model. See N.Y.
Bus. CORP. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1983).
116 Of course, the parent corporation also could offer minority shareholders in the subsid-
iary additional compensation for their loss.
117 See ALI Draft No. 3, supra note 1, § 5.11 comment a, § 5.15 comment d, illustration 8.
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all shareholders receive the same price per share, but he must resist the
temptation to appropriate the benefits of property or opportunities that
belong to his corporation or its shareholders. Thus, he may not secretly
receive a premium for his shares that otherwise would have been avail-
able to all shareholders and then encourage others to sell at a non-
premium price."18 He also is prohibited from retaining more than his
pro rata share of a payment for the right to allocate corporate resources
or otherwise to exercise powers held in trust for the corporation. 119
Duty of loyalty rules do not provide a basis for regulating transac-
tions in which incumbent management uses corporate resources to re-
tain its control. The parties directly involved in such a transaction will
normally be a corporation and some unrelated person, suggesting that
the duty of care should govern the transaction. But these transactions
usually will allow managers to retain their corporate offices. Thus, these
transactions make unrealistic the duty of care's assumption that manag-
ers will behave unselfishly.
Moreover, the market for corporate control in general, and tender
offers in particular, are the most important disciplinary factors in the
corporate governance system, and should be encouraged. A substantial
body of economic literature, both theoretical and empirical, supports
this view. 120 Several recent empirical studies have found that tender
offers increase the wealth of target company shareholders and do not
significantly diminish the wealth of bidding company shareholders, thus
producing a net gain in shareholder wealth. At least one study suggests
that this gain results from synergistic benefits produced by combining
two companies, or by concentrating ownership in a few shareholders. 121
Internal monitoring costs are much lower than external monitoring
costs; thus, acquiring firms probably eliminate agency costs relating to
the acquired firms' operations.' 22 These costs probably are associated
with business judgments made by acquired firms' managements, partic-
ularly judgments about their firms' capital structure. 123 In few situa-
118 Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Ct. App. 1969).
119 See Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464
(1969); Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955). Looting cases involving rights of
access to a corporation's liquid assets, such as DeBaun v. First W. Bank & Trust Co., 46 Cal.
App. 3d 686, 120 Cal. Rptr. 354 (Ct. App. 1975), and Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622,
30 N.Y.S.2d 755 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) also can be viewed as turning on managers' appropria-
tion of corporate property. Assessment ofconsequential damages against selling shareholders,
however, must be based on a different theory, such as aiding and abetting.
120 Symposium on The Marketfor Corporate Control The Scientifx Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON.
(Jensen ed. 1983), is the most recent collection of empirical work. Manne, supra note 74, is the
seminal theoretical article.
121 Bradley, Desai & Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfom Tender O rs: Infornation or S n-
ergy, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183, 204-06 & 204 n.12 (1983). "[T]he stockholders of unsuccessful
bidding firms suffer a significant wealth loss in the wake of an unsuccessful offer." Id. at 186.
122 See Williamson, supra note 9, at 1559.
123 A major source of the gains produced by tender offers, both those leading to combina-
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tions is the possibility of eliminating managers' unfair self-dealing likely
to justify the premiums customarily paid in takeover bids.
The economic literature contains fewer empirical studies of the
wealth effects of transactions designed to fend off threats to control, per-
haps because analysts find it difficult to classify defensive transactions in
a manner that makes feasible collection and analysis of relevant data.
Basic market theory suggests that the person prepared to pay the most
for a firm is the person most able to employ its resources efficiently. In
addition, two recent empirical studies on standstill agreements and
targeted stock repurchases have found that these defensive transactions
resulted in wealth losses to the firm's remaining shareholders. 24 The
authors of one of those studies concluded that their results cast "serious
doubt on the wisdom of. . .judicial rulings" upholding targeted stock
repurchases.12 5 The two studies also support, by implication, the argu-
ments of several legal commentators that other defensive actions usually
do not advance the interest of the target company's shareholders. 126
The ALI Project has not yet addressed corporate control transac-
tions. Recent court decisions have allowed incumbent managements
steadily increasing latitude to use defensive tactics, ranging from stock
repurchases to questionable expansion decisions to sales of important
corporate assets. The courts rarely have upset actions authorized by
nonmanagement directors, treating such actions as business judgments if
the decisions had a rational basis.' 27 Given the ALI Project's general
reluctance to depart too far from decided cases, it is probable that the
ALI will propose to restrict defensive tactics rather than to prohibit
them. 28 A likely recommendation is that transactions that protect con-
trol be treated as unlawful unless a majority of a corporation's unaffili-
tions of firms and those in which the public shareholders are bought out by a management
group (i.e., leveraged buy-outs), may result from the highly leveraged capital structure of the
acquiring firms. Indirect gains are from the tax advantages inherent in debt, rather than
equity, financing. Regulatory restrictions may make it attractive for banks to finance tender
offers even if they are not compensated fully for the associated risks.
124 Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Thvatel Negotiated Stack Repurchases, and the
Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. EcON. 275 (1983); Bradley & Wakeman, The Wealth
Effects of Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 301 (1983).
125 Bradley & Wakeman, supra note 124, at 327.
126 See, e.g., Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1984); Bebehuk, The Case
for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028 (1982); Gilson, A Structural Ap-
proach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819
(1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus.
LAW. 1733 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding
to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
127 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981).
128 Professor Coffee, one of the reporters for the ALl Project, referred recently to the
constitutional and political problems involved in state regulation of defensive tactics. See
Coffee, supra note 126, at 1251.
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ated directors authorized the transaction and are able to prove they had
grounds to believe that it was reasonable, or fair.129
Such a recommendation would defeat itself; it would pave the way
through "the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions"' 30 for a
return to the current permissive status of the law. The scenario is not
unprecedented. Courts once uniformly held that control of corporations
must be determined by market forces, not by directors' decisions about
what was reasonable or fair. Although the courts have never explicitly
reconsidered or rejected this market-oriented rationale, case by case the
courts have sanctioned an increasing list of tactics designed to protect
control.' 3 t The first "particular exceptions" may have been motivated
by the courts' aversion to potential acquirers. 132 After opening the door
to some defensive tactics, the courts found it difficult to outlaw others
because doing so might impose "draconian" liabilities on outside direc-
tors who had acted in good faith. Corporate counsel, relying on the
courts' early permissive decisions, routinely advised directors that they
could approve any defensive transaction they reasonably believed to be
in their corporations' best interest, and that the business judgment rule
would insulate their decisions from judicial second-guessing. 33
The traditional reluctance of courts to saddle outside directors with
large liabilities also is likely to undermine any rule that limits but does
not prohibit defensive tactics. If the law provides directors (and their
counsel) some basis to believe certain defensive transactions are permit-
ted, eventually a board will test the law's limits. Faced with a hostile
takeover bid, the board will approve a defensive action that most rea-
sonable people would view as unwise or unwarranted. But when a court
must decide whether to impose tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in
liability on outside directors who gained very little personally from au-
thorizing the transaction at issue, and who arguably did no more than
reach an incorrect decision, the court is likely to resolve its doubts by
129 Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) and Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del.
Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) provide ample support for such a rule. For a critique of fairness
concepts in corporate control situations, see Gilson, supra note 126, at 824-31.
130 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1923).
t31 For a more detailed review of these developments, see Weiss, Defensive Responses to
Tender 0.fers and the Williams Act6s Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1087,
1111-14 (1982).
132 The basis for the courts' aversion appears to have varied. Compare McPhail v. L.S.
Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (Ist Cir. 1958) ("raider" with history of manipulating acquired
companies' affairs) with Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 500, 199 A.2d 548, 551 (1964)
(potential acquirer, who wanted to change fraudulent sales practices of target company, was
" 'well known and not highly regarded by any stretch'" in the Kalamazoo-Battle Creek and
Detroit areas) (quoting defendant P.T. Cheff).
133 In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981), plaintiffs sued defendant directors for more than $200 million. These directors had
authorized a number of questionable transactions after consulting experienced takeover
lawyers.
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holding that the transaction was not unlawful. That decision will ex-
pand the list of permissible defensive tactics, as will each ensuing deci-
sion by a court reluctant to "penalize" defense-minded outside directors.
The ALI Project should avoid this danger by proposing a bright-
line rule prohibiting defensive transactions. Directors presumably
would then be reluctant to take prohibited actions, and courts presuma-
bly would be prepared to impose liability on directors who have flouted
the law's clear command. 134
The best rule would limit a target company's management to pro-
moting an auction for its shares. Publicly held corporations in the
United Kindgom operate subject to such a rule, 135 and Professor Ronald
Gilson has suggested the following adaptation of that rule for use in the
United States:
During the period commencing with the date on which target man-
agement has reason to believe that a tender offer may be made for
part or all of a target company's equity securities, and ending at such
time thereafter that the offeror shall have had a reasonable period in
which to present the offer to target shareholders, no action shall be taken
by the target company which could interfere with the success of the o er or result
in the shareholders of the target company being denied the opportunity to tender
their shares, except that the target company (1) may disclose to the
public or its shareholders information bearing on the value or the at-
tractiveness of the offer, and (2) may seek out alternative transactions
which it believes may be more favorable to target shareholders. 136
Professor Gilson's proposal is sound in concept, but it may be read
as prohibiting too much, and therefore could be interpreted to prohibit
too little. The rule's purpose is not to prevent a target company from
taking actions in the ordinary course of business when a tender offer is
imminent or outstanding. A court, however, could view every decision
directors make as one designed to "interfere with the success of" a pend-
ing tender offer, just as the Third Circuit has stated that every such
decision "is in part attributable to [a director's] desire to keep sharehold-
ers satisfied so that they will not oust him."' 37 Given this possibility, a
134 If directors engage in prohibited transactions, courts may be asked to determine their
unreasonableness or unfairness in order to assess damages. The prospect of damage suits
could be minimized by authorizing bidders to maintain suits to enjoin or void prohibited
defensive transactions. Cf. Weiss, supra note 131, at 1118-21.
135 The rule was written and is administered by an industry group in England, the Panel
on Take-overs and Mergers. THE CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS (rev. ed.
1972) (amended 1974) [hereinafter cited as THE CrrY CODE]. The Panel cannot impose for-
mal sanctions, but the stock exchange and other organizations penalize members who violate
the Code. Seegenerally M. WEINBERG, TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS 122-29 (3d ed. 1971) (de-
tailing the Panel's sources of power); DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons
From the British, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 945 (1983) (comparing British and American regulation).
136 Gilson, supra note 126, at 878-79 (emphasis added)..
'37 Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980).
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court faced with a challenged transaction arranged while a tender offer
was pending-such as a contract to acquire a factory that competes with
one owned by the tender offerer-may feel it must decide whether that
transaction represented legitimate profit seeking, or whether it was pri-
marily defensive. The result could be a parade of particular exceptions
to the bright-line prohibition Professor Gilson intends. 38
To avoid this potential problem, the ALI Project should append
the following, also adapted from the British rule, to Professor Gilson's
proposal:
The following actions shall always be treated as having the potential
to interfere with the success of an offer or to result in the shareholders
of a target company being denied the opportunity to tender their
shares, except where such actions are taken pursuant to a written con-
tract entered into prior to the date on which target management had
reason to believe that a tender offer might be made for part or all of a
target company's equity securities:
(1) Issue any authorized but un-issued shares (including treasury
shares);
(2) Issue or grant an option in respect of any un-issued shares;
(3) Create or issue or permit creation or issue of any securities
carrying rights of conversion into or subscription for shares of the
company;
(4) Sell, dispose of, or acquire, or agree to sell, dispose of, or ac-
quire assets of material amounts;
(5) Acquire, or agree to acquire, any of its own securities, except
by means of a tender offer made to all target company shareholders.
(6) Engage in any other transaction not in the ordinary course of
business. 39
The ALI Project also should deal with the problems posed by an
incumbent management's almost unlimited use of corporate resources to
solicit proxies, and its ability to repurchase stock from a person threaten-
ing a proxy fight. Dissident shareholders or outsiders often find it less
attractive to seek control of a corporation by way of a proxy fight than
by way of a tender offer.' 40 The proxy fight's disadvantaged status
138 It is not difficult to believe that a court prepared to disregard "ineptly drawn" min-
utes of a board meeting, in order to exculpate from liability outside directors who the minutes
reported had ratified an improper, defensively-motivated stock repurchase, see Bennett v.
Propp, 41 Del. Ch. at 24, 187 A.2d at 410, also would disregard the intent of Professor Gil-
son's proposed rule, if the language of the rule did not explicitly prohibit the behavior in
question.
139 Compare THE CITY CODE, supra note 135, rule 38. The British rule allows prohibited
transactions to proceed if they are approved by shareholders. Id. Such a modification of the
proposed rule would be unobjectionable. Coffee, supra note 126, at 1282-89, suggests regula-
tion of certain bidder tactics as well. See also DeMott, supra note 135, at 1014 ("There is a
certain rough justice in the fact that defensive transactions are more difficult to execute in
Britain for. . . hostile offers are also generally more difficult to execute in Britain.").
140 Weiss, supra note 81, at 580-84.
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should give the Project an incentive to find ways to strengthen it.
Thus, the ALI should propose that the aforementioned prohibitions
also apply to the period commencing with the date on which a corpora-
tion's management has reason to believe that shareholders of the corpo-
ration are likely to solicit proxies or consents in order (1) to elect as a
director or directors a person or persons other than those nominated by
management; or (2) to withhold approval of any transaction, act, or pol-
icy that management has submitted, or indicated it intends to submit, to
shareholders for their approval.141
In addition, an incumbent management should be barred from us-
ing corporate resources to republish previously disclosed information or
to finance proxy solicitation efforts other than those customarily made
in uncontested elections. This prohibition, however, should not be con-
strued so strictly that it would prevent a management facing a proxy
fight from disclosing to its shareholders a reasonable amount of informa-
tion bearing on its performance, or on the merits of any transaction or
proposal at issue. 142
V
OTHER ISSUES
Rules relating to managers' fiduciary duties and shareholders' rem-
edies for breach of those duties are the core elements of the corporate
governance system. The ALI Project's recomendations affect two other
areas: whether disclosure obligations should be made a part of the cor-
porate governance system, and whether corporations should be required
or allowed to sacrifice profits to benefit constituencies other than their
shareholders.
A. Disclosure Obligations
The federal securities laws impose disclosure requirements on cor-
porations, their directors, and their senior executives. Although these
requirements are designed primarily to meet the needs of the securities
markets and to ensure the fairness of the proxy solicitation process, they
also complement both the exit and the voice components of the corpo-
rate governance system.1 43 Shareholders, as well as potential investors,
must have access to corporate information in order to decide whether
141 In order to avoid incapacitating a corporation for too long, these prohibitions should
terminate after a corporation has conducted its annual shareholders meeting or has held a
special meeting to vote on a controverted matter.
142 That is, an incumbent management should be able to use corporate resources to make
sure shareholders are reasonably informed about the issues involved in a proxy contest. See
Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 37 Del. Ch. 17, 134 A.2d 852 (1957). But cf. Eisenberg, Access to the
Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1489 (1970).
143 See Weiss, supra note 81, at 590-95.
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they should buy or sell a corporation's shares, replace its management,
or initiate litigation on its behalf to remedy breaches of the duty of
loyalty.
The ALI Project has signaled its concern about disclosure through
two proposals: that large publicly held corporations be required to have
audit committees comprised of outside directors and that all publicly
held corporations have audit committees responsible for ensuring the
accuracy and integrity of corporate financial reports. 144 These proposals
are grounded in the belief that self-serving disclosure practices are com-
parable to a breach of the duty of loyalty. Corporate managers may
suppress or misrepresent corporate information to advance their per-
sonal interests, even where their actions lead investors to distrust a cor-
poration's disclosures and to discount the price they will pay for its
shares, thereby increasing the cost of the corporation's capital.
When the ALI Federal Securities Code was being developed, the
reporter proposed a requirement that corporate directors and senior ex-
ecutives exercise due diligence to ensure that the periodic reports filed
by registered companies are not materially false or misleading.145 The
Institute neither accepted nor rejected that proposal.
Because disclosure plays such an important role in the corporate
governance system, the ALI Corporate Governance Project should re-
visit this question. Threatening outside directors with liability for fail-
ing to ensure the accuracy of their corporation's financial reports is
preferable to threatening them with due care liability, which might re-
duce their willingness to take business risks. Directors could limit the
threat of liability for inaccurate disclosures by selecting competent pub-
lic accountants and ensuring that management did not subject those
accountants to inappropriate pressures.1 46 Nonetheless, threats of liabil-
ity may discourage qualified outsiders from serving as directors. Thus,
the ALI Project should consider imposing disclosure obligations only on
a corporation's senior executives or limiting the dollar amount of direc-
tors' potential liability for faulty disclosures, as it now proposes to limit
their liability for violations of the duty of due care. 147
144 See ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, §§ 3.03, 3.05.
145 A substantial proportion of the ALI's membership opposed the reporter's proposal, on
the grounds that it would increase unduly the threat of liability. The final ALI draft in-
cluded alternative proposals-the original, due diligence standard, and a standard requiring
proof of scienter before a director could be held liable. See FED. SEC. CODE § 1704 (1978).
146 Accountants may be under increasing pressure to ensure the accuracy and integrity of
the financial reports they certify. See, e.g., Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d
138 (1983) (defendant public accountants not entitled to summary judgment where facts indi-
cate they may be liable to user of financial report, with whom accountants were not in priv-
ity, for damages resulting from user's reliance on negligently prepared report).
147 See ALI Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 7.06 (d). If the ALI Project adopts this proposal, it
would need to consider a number of subsidiary issues, analysis of which is beyond the scope of
this Article. These include deciding who should have standing to enforce a disclosure obliga-
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B. Profit Maximization and Ethical Principles
Much of the discussion that preceded the ALI Project focused on
whether corporate law should require firms to sacrifice profits to ad-
vance the interests of nonshareholder constituencies. 143 The Project has
accepted the traditional notion that "[a] business corporation is organ-
ized and carried on primarily for the profit of stockholders. The powers
of the directors are to be employed to that end."'149 The Project pro-
poses that corporations be required to sacrifice profits only when neces-
sary to conform to the law.' 50 In addition, the Project would allow
corporations to sacrifice profits to take account of "ethical considera-
tions that are reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible con-
duct of business,"151 and to devote reasonable amounts of their resources
to charitable purposes. 152
This Article's recommendations concerning due care liability and
control transactions would moot the liability implications of the ALI
Project's proposals to allow corporations to use their profits in ways
other than to advance shareholders' interests. Corporate managers
would risk no liability by using their company's resources to advance
altruistic objectives, and would be barred from using those resources for
defensive transactions that arguably were altruistically motivated.
Whether or not the ALI Project accepts this Article's recommenda-
tions, its proposal that corporations be allowed to sacrifice profits to take
account of ethical considerations is unlikely to have significant immedi-
ate effects. The ALI, the courts, and sophisticated practitioners recog-
nize that corporate law currently allows, and may even obligate,
corporate managers to consider ethical principles when they make busi-
ness decisions. 153 Community good will and possible government regu-
lation both bear on most corporations' ability to continue operating
profitably. The business judgment rule shields managers' decisions to
cause their corporations to incur identifiable costs in order to satisfy
moral obligations or achieve social objectives. Courts consistently have
held that managers who exercised reasonable care and had some ra-
tion, whether defendant directors and executives should bear the burden of demonstrating
due diligence once a failure to disclose accurately has been proved, how "material negative
information" should be defined, and whether senior executives should be responsible for in-
cluding negative information in all of a corporation's public statements or only in specified
periodic reports.
148 See COMMENTARIES, supra note 2, at 245-83.
149 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919); see also ALI
Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01 and accompanying comments.
150 ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01.
1-51 I[d. § 2.01 (b).
152 Id. § 2.01(c).
153 The ALI emphasizes this view in its discussion of the objective of corporate activity.
See id. § 2.01 comment e.
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tional basis for incurring such costs did not breach any duty to their
corporations. 54
What, then, is to be gained by explicitly authorizing managers to
sacrifice profits to advance ethical goals? The ALI Project says its pro-
posal relates to "ongoing corporations,"' 155 but it points to no circum-
stances that would now prevent the managers of an operating
corporation from taking account of ethical considerations. Indeed, the
Project illustrates the proposed authority with hypotheticals involving
corporations on the verge of dissolution. t56
The ALI may have based its proposal on a belief that managers
should not be required to justify as profit-maximizing the ethical deci-
sions they make. 157 Some managers may avoid pursuing ethically moti-
vated courses of conduct because they are concerned about comparing
"soft" ethical benefits with "hard" dollar costs. 158 However, corporate
law does not require managers to estimate precisely the dollar costs and
dollar benefits of every action they take; courts have accepted virtually
every argument that socially or ethically motivated conduct should be
upheld as "good for business."' 159 Thus, the ALI proposal's direct im-
pact on corporate decisionmaking will be minor; managers will be al-
lowed to justify solely in ethical terms decisions they now may feel
compelled to explain as profit-oriented.
There is, nonetheless, good reason for the ALI Project to persist
with this proposal. 160 Corporate law issues increasingly are being dis-
cussed as if corporations are purely economic entities, and as if corporate
law's only objective is to reconcile the interests of managers and share-
154 See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968) (directors of
baseball corporation not in breach for failing to install lights for night games resulting in
financial loss because directors believed baseball to be daytime sport); Kelly v. Bell, 266 A.2d
878 (Del. 1970) (directors of steel company not liable to shareholders for agreement to make
payments to county on machinery in lieu of tax that had been abolished).
155 ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01 comment h.
156 Id. § 2.01 comment h, illustration 11; comment i, illustrations 14, 21.
157 The ALI justifies its proposal as follows: "[O]bservation suggests that corporate deci-
sions are not infrequently made on the basis of ethical consideration even when doing so does
not enhance corporate profits or shareholder gains. Such behavior is not only appropriate,
but desirable." ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01 comment h.
158 See Weiss, supra note 9, at 363-77, for a discussion of the factors that deter many
corporate managers from responding constructively to social pressures and ethical
considerations.
159 See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968); Kelly v. Bell, 226
A.2d 878 (Del. 1970).
160 The Institute tentatively approved § 2.01 at its 1984 meeting. See supra note 4. The
principal danger posed by § 2.01 is that managers threatened with hostile takeover bids may
suddenly become acutely sensitive to their "social obligations" to employees or communities
and attempt to justify opposition to threats to control on ethical grounds. See Lipton, Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 105-06 (1979) (arguing that target company
management can appropriately cite social concerns as basis for opposing tender offers). The
ALI Project seems alert to this possibility. See ALI Draft No. 2, supra note 1, § 2.01 comment
h (stating special rules may limit role of ethical considerations in control transaction).
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holders in a fashion that maximizes their combined wealth. 61 The
ALI's recommendation that corporations be authorized to take account
of ethical considerations serves as a reminder that more than economic
values are at stake.
Societal well-being would be increased if corporations were to
forego profits to the extent necessary to reflect the external costs and
benefits associated with their activities.162 Questions concerning
whether, and to what extent, corporations should be required to deviate
from the pursuit of profits are political, however, and should be resolved
by appropriate governmental bodies. 163 The ALI is more a technocratic
than a political entity-better suited to designing a system to regulate
the relationships of participants within corporations than to deciding
whether the traditional objective of corporate activity should be modi-
fied. But the ALI also appreciates that law-even corporate law, which
deals with essentially economic entities and issues-requires more than
economic analysis. 164 When courts decide corporate law disputes, they
must remain sensitive to the social and political environment.
Publicly held corporations are the most important nongovernmen-
tal institutions in American society. The private quasi-contractual ar-
rangements made by participants in those corporations have broad
social implications. This potential should inform the courts when they
decide corporate law disputes. For example, a court might credit The
New York Time's recent report that a " 'me-first, grab-what-you-can' ex-
travagance apears to be cropping up among the nation's top execu-
tives."' 165 The court also might believe that continuation of this trend is
likely to breed similar attitudes among other groups in society-workers,
professionals, or public officials, for instance. In that event, when decid-
ing a case challenging multi-million dollar "golden parachute" pay-
ments to executives who, after years of mediocre performance, had been
ousted by a hostile takeover bid, the court might view with particular
skepticism the executives' arguments in support of those payments. 166
Specifying exactly how social or political or "ethical" concerns
161 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 6; Winter, supra note 2; and sources cited supra note 126. The
bulk of this Article, too, analyzes the ALI Project largely with reference to economic values.
162 See Weiss, supra note 9, at 418-26.
163 Id. at 436-37.
164 See, e.g., Leff, Economic Analysis of Law." Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 U. VA. L.
REV. 451 (1974) (arguing that economic analysis is a useful, but distinctly limited, technique
for dealing with legal disputes).
165 N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1984, § 3, at 1, col. 3. The 7imes prefaced this statement with
the observation: "It doesn't take a revolutionary to figure out that something is amiss in
American business today." Id.
166 Cf Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (enjoining golden parachute
plan because proxy statement soliciting shareholder approval was misleading). But Cf Lewis
v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984) (denying shareholder of acquired corporation stand-
ing to challenge golden parachute payments).
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should shape the courts' corporate law decisions is not a task the ALI
Project should undertake, however. To attempt such specification
would plunge the Project, which already has proven to be quite contro-
versial, into a morass of unnecessary controversy. The Project's assertion
that ethical considerations are relevant to the conduct of corporate ac-
tivities serves as a sufficient reminder of corporations' and corporate
law's broader purposes.
